Rodao - Franco and the Japanese Empire

Abstract

Most remarkable

Preface

Index

Annexes

Annexes Ph. Diss. 1993

Secret information messages. Magic Summaries

Information about Japan relied from Tokyo

“Spain and Japan” by Ernesto Jiménez Caballero

More annexes

News on Japan in ¡Arriba ¡

Table comparing dates in relations between Spain and Japan

Documentation

Bibliography

Citations

Reviews

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Franco´s Spain and the Japanese Empire:

Images and Propaganda in a Time of War

[Franco y el imperio japonés. Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de Guerra]

Barcelona: Plaza & Janés, 2002. 669 pp.

ISBN 84.01.53054.7

The Spanish Civil War, Chinese-Japanese War, World War II, and Pacific War gave a tremendous impetus to relations between Spain and Japan, raising them to a level of international importance. And as mutual interests developed between Spain and Japan during the decade between the years 1936-45, they even had an impact on domestic policy, as reflected in the way each country depicted the other in its official propaganda.

Wars in Spain and in China were simultaneous after July 1937. This was not only a primary reason for the alignment between Germans, Japanese and Italians against the Democratic Powers and the USSR, but also provoked an identification among the conflicting parties. In Spain, while the Nationalists identified themselves with the Japanese, the Republicans were sympathetic to the Chinese. In Asia, the battles between Spaniards were perceived by the Japanese to be very useful to them, permitting to learn about the latest Soviet military technology (M-80 Tank or Molotov Cocktail, for instance) in order to prepare for their foreseen confrontation with the USSR. Among the Chinese, the Communists became specially interested, not only making use of news from Spain in order to enhance their strategies (with slogans like "No Pasarán," or proposals to defend the Chinese capital, Wuhan, following the example seen in Spain), but also inviting Spanish Communists to China to help organize their youth.

After the end of the Spanish War, April 1939, the identification between Spaniards and Chinese/Japanese that had resulted from the simultaneity of conflicts began to disappear, but with the outbreak of the war in Europe the interest between Franco's Spain and Japanese militarists revived again. Both regimes pursued parallel initiatives in search of the “New Order” expected to emerge from the German aggressions. Tokyo and Madrid sided with the Axis, but did not participate in the European fray, being their help mostly by weakening their enemies or by serving as bases for espionage and propaganda, therefore considered by the Nazi regime mostly collateral. From the Spanish and Japanese standpoints, however, their help was essential, but also both were determined to play a more active role. Therefore, mutual interest increased and focused not only on listening news about the German victories but considering them on a larger perspective: they also anticipated plans for such “New Order” once the war ended. This expectation of the benefits that would accrue from following the path of Germany was the main motivation for interaction between Spaniards and Japanese. As a consequence, the basis of the friendship between the two countries changed, with the fight against the Soviet Union becoming overshadowed by the prospects of a bright future emerging under a new hegemonic world order. Their aims were widely separated as both countries looked forward to increasing their power and influence in adjacent regions: North Africa and East Asia. Ostensibly, little cooperation was needed when thinking on their Imperial ambitions, but there was one area where the collaboration of both countries was possible: the Philippine Archipelago. This prospect led them to share a common enemy: the United States of America.

Once the Pacific War started, Madrid’s position changed as the occupation of the Philippines showed clearly how impossible was to match both aims. On one hand, Spain became the country that helped Japan the most in its war effort, taking up the two most important petitions Tokyo asked to a country not involved in the war: to represent its interests and nationals in most of the Americas and to help in espionage activities. Spaniards helped Japanese with intelligence gathering, being the main result the creation of Tô, a network of Spanish intelligence agents working for the Japanese in the Americas. On the other hand, however, the pro-Japanese policy inside the Franco regime provoked strong controversies against the Falangistas, as the Japanese occupation of the Philippines soon found that the support of Japan's occupation was bringing few, if any, benefits to Spain. The mutuality of future perspectives collided as realities clashed with expectations.

The former Philippine colony, furthermore, was the main cause of the increasing tension between Madrid and Japan. This tension became apparent to the Allies in the summer of 1942 when Franco distanced himself about the future of the Japanese military and later dismissed his brother-in-law and Falangist Foreign Affairs Minister, Serrano Suñer. Anti-Falangists forces gained strength and Serrano Suñer’s successor, Count of Jordana, intended the difficult task of moving toward the Allies and proclaiming Neutrality in spite of continuing pro-German activities until very late in World War II. In this policy, Spain’s estrangement with Japan contributed to the move toward compensating friendship with Nazi Germany with tension with Japan. These tensions were articulated more clearly by the Spanish dictator Franco, during a conversation with the American Ambassador in July 1943, when he explained the participation of his country in the world in these moments with a theory of three simultaneous wars. While proclaiming Neutrality in the war between the Allies and the Axis, Franco recognized Spain's continued support for the German fight against the Soviets, but pointed immediately that it was compensated by his Government’s backing of the war against Japan by the Allies. This radical policy change against Japan was initiated by Franco's regime as part of its effort to survive after the anticipated triumph of the Allies, but the radical change of the attitude can be seen clearly in the official Falangist newspaper Arriba, which openly questioned its own former pro-japanism as being too excessive. This move culminated in Madrid's attempted declaration of war against Japan in March 1945, a direction that Washington had been pressing Franco toward for some time.

Such a turnabout exposed the fragile nature of the relationship between Spain and Japan, a relationship that in a short period of time moved not only from friendship to enmity, but also form high interest to total ignorance, as was even unable to survive the war years. A similar changing relationship during the war was less apparent with German Nazis and Italian Fascists, despite the fact that the Japanese military was at the time more successful. The friendship between Madrid and Tokyo lacked a stable base, since the two countries did not enjoy meaningful commercial, economic, or political relations. Moreover, the relationship was negatively affected by ill feelings and racial antipathy and the distance between Spain and Japan was less geographical than it was cultural. The racial prejudices and numerous socio-cultural stereotypes could not be concealed in Spain even at the height of the relationship; therefore, as the Japanese armies lost steam, the negative perceptions unraveled. Furthermore, when the possibility of establishing closer relations with the United States emerged, negative images of Japan became privileged instruments of policy. Since preexisting stereotypes persisted, they could be conveniently manipulated against Japanese to serve the propaganda needs of a changing policy. Images preceded facts.

1. Most remarkable data in the book

A. Espionage. One of the main Spanish contributions to the Japanese war effort was his help in obtaining and forwarding intelligence through different channels. The most widely known mechanism was a network, called Tô, that procured information in the United States. Tô didn’t provide very accurate information, but it was the agency that captured the most attention from the American Counterintelligence, or G-2, as can be observed in the daily bulletins reproducing decoded enemy messages, referred to as Magic Summaries. When these bulletins were released to the public in 1978, the Tô network and its connections with the Spanish Foreign Affairs Ministry, together with the involvement of some diplomats, received a good deal on TV and the press, not only in Spain or Japan, but also in the US, where The Washington Post featured the story on its first page. These and other recently released intelligence records (including the earlier Red machine documents), reveal to revealed to researchers for the first time the role of espionage in the relations between Spain and Japan. Declassified in 1994, these decoded records have been rarely utilized and allow this book to present a comprehensive discussion of the role of espionage in World War II and to analyze the contributions of the Tô network to the Japanese war effort. In addition to these documents, the book makes use of a wide collection of documentation from Spanish, American and Japanese sources, and incorporates interviews with several participants, including Angel Alcázar de Velasco, the head of the Tô network.

B. Laurel Incident. During the World War II, the most tense moments between Washington and Madrid were the months of October and November 1943, when the Franco Government recognized the newly independent Philippine Republic under Jose P. Laurel, which to the Americans was still a Japanese puppet government. The U.S. reacted angrily against Franco, as numerous articles show, and the American government cancelled contacts with Madrid and filtered invasion plans of the Iberian peninsula, pressuring Madrid to take serious steps to end its collaboration with the Axis and to cut off its supplies of the very needed mineral, wolfram. The Laurel incident is mentioned in every work dealing with Spain and World War II, and is the subject of the book by James W. Cortada, Spanish Relations, Wolfram and World War II, (Barcelona: Manuel Pareja, 1971). The analysis in Franco’s Spain and the Japanese Empire, however, proposes a new interpretation of this affair. The American reaction to the Laurel incident was artificially provoked, since as a result of decoded messages, the Americans were aware of the Spanish government’s reluctance to send its recognition of Philippine independence, leading Washington to manipulate the sour state of the Spanish-Japanese relations to drive a wedge between Spain and Germany.

C. Spanish ambitions in the Philippines. At the beginning of World War II, encouraged by the continuous string of German victories and amid an atmosphere of increasing expectations for a New Order, the Spanish government anticipated its increasing influence in the Philippine Archipelago as Japanese hegemony spread across the region. Some articles published in the Spanish press even suggested the possible revival of Spanish dominion in the Philippines. These ambitions, rooted in the anticipated decline of American influence in the Philippines, soon clashed with reality. Spanish imperial ambitions during the years 1940-41, together with its collaboration with the Axis, were disseminated later by the U.S., as clearly demonstrated in the book, Falange: the Secret Army of the Axis in the Americas, simultaneously published in 1943 in English and Spanish (New York, La Havana) and with four editions during its year of the publication. The book starts with the case of the Philippines and not only accuses the Falange of having imperialist ambitions, but focuses on one of the wealthiest persons in the Islands, Andres Soriano, as the main instigator for these Spanish aims. Soriano was the most significant representative of the so-called Spanish Party; he was the proprietor of San Miguel Brewery and served as an officer under General MacArthur in the resistance to the Japanese forces in 1942. Allegations in this book have not been challenged until my article “Spanish Falange in the Philippines, 1936-45” (widely known and translated into Tagalog and Spanish). Franco’s Spain and the Japanese Empire offers new data and interpretations of the Spanish ambitions, viewing these developments in a larger context that includes, among other things, the influence of the dehispanization of the Islands and Filipino nationalism.

D. Blue Marine Division. At the end of World War II, Madrid launched a fierce propaganda attack against the Japanese, cancelled its representations of Japanese interests and those of its citizens in the Americas, broke off diplomatic relations with Tokyo and considered the possibility of a declaration of war, in part due to recent in Manila. Tokyo was also accused of sending to take action against Spaniards in the Philippines. This policy shift, however, had been planned by Franco, who desperately needed to improve his relations with the Allies; the attack over the Japanese Empire was one of the few cards he could play in making them forget his earlier leaning toward the Axis. The limited existing documentation also indicates that the Franco government may have been considering participation in the Pacific War by sending a second Blue Division, similar to the battalion sent in 1941 to fight with the Axis against the Soviet Union. The new Blue Division was to consist of some ships. This willingness to enter the armed conflict contradicts the official declarations in Madrid, stressing Franco’s desire to remain neutral in World War II. Not only did Franco violate his professed neutrality by negotiating to enter the war with Germany in Summer-Autumn 1940, he also contemplated assisting the Allied war effort in Spring 1945.

E. Representation of the interests of Japanese citizens. Tokyo asked Madrid to represent its interests with most of the countries in the Americas that had declared war on or broke official relations wit Japan. Spain was chosen mostly due to the ideological identification, but also with the hope that it would help supply intelligence to Tokyo through official conducts. Both sides soon realized the mistake. While the Spaniards suffered from a strong press campaign accusing Spain of collusion with the Axis, the Japanese quickly realized that care of its citizens was a complicated humanitarian task that would require a greater determination and political influence than the Franco government, with its questionable moral position, possessed. As a result, when Japanese citizens in the Americas suffered looting, pillage and discrimination, including the forced removal to internment camps in the interior, Spanish diplomats could do little to alleviate the situation. Forced resettlement, which was not taken against Germans or Italians, has left deep resentments in the Asian American community and has provoked in the United States, in the last decade, the payment of an indemnity to all those forced into internment camps. Among the extensive bibliography on this topic, references to the role played by Spanish officials in influencing these developments are not only scarce, but always taken from U.S. Archives.

F. Yellow Peril and International Relations. Understanding the ideology, images and stereotypes that were projected about the Japanese are essential to an interpretation of the internal nature of the changing relationship between Spain and Japan. The existence of an idealistic image of Japan up to 1941 is a key to understanding decisions and attitudes that induced Spaniards to believe that the Japanese would help them in the Philippines. Thus, Madrid authorized in Summer 1940 an official mission to the Chinese puppet government of Wang Jingwei, then under the Japanese Army, despite the fact that even Tokyo had not yet recognized it. As the Allies forces turned the tide on the Japanese Army, the resilience of old images of Japan faded and Spaniards began to turn against their former friend. The pattern of changing the conceptual framework for perceiving another country from a positive to a negative was not difficult for two countries with such different cultures. The period when Minister Jordana was in charge of Foreign Affairs was the most interesting moment of this turn, since it highlights the need to manipulate, or justify, the change within the context of a dictatorship, as it was Spain, as its internal and external dynamics. Recovering the concept of “Yellow Peril” was crucial in this effort, demonstrating that these sentiments were still close to the surface and only temporarily set aside. Images are always malleable and can be manipulated by convenience.

Prólogo, por Stanley G. Payne

Introducción

Capítulo 1: Lo distinto y lo distante

Capítulo 2: Expectativa de un orden nuevo

Capítulo 3: Colaboración en Asia Oriental

Capítulo 4: Victorias de Japón

Capítulo 5: La amistad embarazosa

Capítulo 6: Las imposibles negociaciones

Capítulo 7: Japón y la posguerra española

Conclusión: La irremisible orientalidad

Notas: fuentes documentales y bibliografía

PRÓLOGO

INTRODUCCION

Las imágenes................................................................................. 20

Las percepciones............................................................................ 26

Representación del problema.......................................................... 32

Franco como ejemplo.................................................................... 36

AGRADECIMIENTOS.......................................................................... 39

ABREVIATURAS................................................................................. 43

Cap. 1

LO DISTINTO Y LO DISTANTE........................................................... 45

1. REACCIONES ANTE LO DIFERENTE.............................................. 46

1.1. España, en busca de un nuevo papel en el mundo..................... 48

1.1.1. La visión tradicionalista ante Japón.......................................... 50

1.1.2. Asia, Oriente y lo desconocido................................................ 52

1.1.3. La peculiaridad de Japón......................................................... 62

1.2. Japón ante lo extranjero......................................................... 74

1.2.1. Occidente y la ambivalencia.................................................... 76

1.2.2. “Asianidad” y el orientalismo japonés...................................... 81

1.2.3. España en el mundo japonés.................................................. 89

2. LOS CONTACTOS HISTÓRICOS.................................................... 94

2.1. La mediación filipina................................................................. 95

2.2. Los lazos privados del siglo XX............................................... 100

Cap. 2

EXPECTATIVA DE UN ORDEN NUEVO............................................. 105

1. UN NUEVO OBJETIVO PARA LOS VIEJOS ALIADOS.................. 108

1.1. Las crecientes ambiciones..................................................... 115

1.2. De la propaganda anticomunista a la lucha anti-Aliada............. 119

1.2.1. Las nuevas imágenes............................................................. 121

2. JAPÓN Y LA RELACIÓN EXTERIOR DE LA POSGUERRA......... 140

2.1. Cambios en la estructura de los contactos............... 140

2.2. La Misión Económica a Japón.......................................... 145

3. EL ATAQUE A LA URSS Y JAPON.............................................. 155

4. CONSECUENCIAS DURADERAS................................................. 163

Cap. 3

COLABORACION EN ASIA ORIENTAL............................................. 165

1. La distante Manchuria......................................................... 165

1.1. El gobierno de Wang Jingwei.................................................. 166

2.1. Autoridad y Legitimidad en China............................................. 168

2.2. Reanudación de la relación....................................................... 173

2.3. Perspectivas favorables para un gobierno pro-japonés.............. 178

2.4. La Misión Económica, en China................................................ 185

2.5. España, sin política en China.................................................... 188

3. Los españoles y el ejército japonés en China............................. 192

4. La Thailandia pro-japonesa....................................................... 195

5. AMBICIONES EN FILIPINAS..................................................... ..198

5.1. La promesa de independencia................................................ 202

5.2. Expectativas de hispanización................................................ 206

5.3. El trampolín japonés.............................................................. 209

5.3.1. Colaboración Propagandista.................................................. 212

5.3.2. “Ejército del Eje”.................................................................. 215

5.3.3. ¿Retomar las Filipinas?.......................................................... 218

6. EL DIFÍCIL OLVIDO .....................................................................225

cap. 4

VICTORIAS DE JAPON..................................................................... 229

1. EL RESPLANDOR DE PEARL HARBOR......................................... 232

1.1. Filipinas entra en la Guerra..................................................... 239

2. UN “JAPONISMO” MÁS ANTI-NORTEAMERICANO.................... 244

3. ESPAÑA ANTE LA MUNDIALIZACIÓN DE LA GUERRA............... 250

3.1. La Guerra del Pacífico y el contexto exterior........................... 250

3.2. La política interior ante Pearl Harbor....................................... 253

4. AYUDA A LA VICTORIA............................................................... 253

4.1. Espionaje.............................................................................. 258

4.1.1. Los españoles, al servicio de la inteligencia japonesa.............. 262

4.1.2. Red de Inteligencia en Estados Unidos................................... 268

4.1.3. El contraespionaje norteamericano....................................... 276

4.2. Representación de Intereses.................................................. 286

4.2.1. Humanitarismo y crítica........................................................ 288

4.3. Apoyo al comercio mutuo..................................................... 290

4.4. Españoles en Filipinas............................................................ 292

4.4.1. Los falangistas y la ocupación............................................... 294

5. LA DESCONFIANZA..................................................................... 300

6. CAIDA DE SERRANO SUÑER....................................................... 307

Cap. 5

LA AMISTAD EMBARAZOSA............................................................ 315

1. NUEVO MINISTRO, NUEVO CONTEXTO....................................... 317

2. LA COLABORACION CONTINÚA................................................. 322

2.1. La cada vez más difícil Inteligencia.......................................... 327

2.1.1. Una difícil expansión de la Red Tô.......................................... 332

2.1.2. Una valoración del espionaje en España................................ 338

2.1.3. Credibilidad ante el gobierno de Japón................................... 342

2.1.4. Exaltación nacionalista en Japón........................................... 350

2.2. La representación de intereses de Japón................................ 354

3. ESPAÑOLES BAJO UN JAPÓN EN GUERRA................................. 359

3.1. Falangistas y pelotaris en la Gran Asia Oriental....................... 364

4. vUELTA A LAS IMÁGENES TRADICIONALES............................. 370

cap. 6

LAS IMPOSIBLES NEGOCIACIONES............................................... 381

1. Un cambio de tendencia........................................................... 383

2. La preferencia por las Filipinas ante China.................................. 391

2.1. Derechos en China.................................................................. 395

2.2. Las tres guerras de Franco...................................................... 404

3. El “Incidente Laurel”.................................................................. 406

3.1. El trampolín tecnológico........................................................... 416

3.2. Una reestructuración en el exterior.......................................... 425

4. LA TENSIÓN SE HACE PÚBLICA.................................................. 427

4.1 Deseo por unirse al bando antijaponés.................................... 429

4.2. La Falange muestra su "antijaponismo".................................. 441

5. LAS INCERTIDUMBRES DE JORDANA......................................... 450

Cap. 7

JAPÓN Y LA POSTGUERRA ESPAÑOLA........................................... 455

1. UNA NUEVA POSTURA HACIA JAPON........................................ 457

1.1. Los estereotipos recobran vigor............................................. 465

1.2. La conveniencia de un enemigo.............................................. 470

2. MASACRE EN MANILA................................................................ 479

3. LA RUPTURA PAULATINA........................................................... 490

4. LOS ENTRESIJOS DE UNA POSIBLE GUERRA............................ 490

4.1. Influencias moderadoras para Madrid..................................... 500

4.2. Planes para una utilización propagandista............................... 505

4.3. La División Azul Marina......................................................... 506

4.4. Los objetivos........................................................................ 507

5. ULTIMAS RELACIONES............................................................... 419

5.1. La segunda No-beligerancia................................................... 422

Conclusión

LA IRREMISIBLE ORIENTALIDAD.................................................. 519

La ascensión social y la ascensión nacional ........................................... 529

Distintos contextos, factores parecidos ............................................... 532

NOTAS

FUENTES DOCUMENTALES Y BIBLIOGRAFIA................................. 593

A. CENTROS DE DOCUMENTACION........................................................

1. ESPAÑA:........................................................................................

1. A. Archivos......................................................................................

1.B. Hemerotecas................................................................................

1.C. Bibliotecas....................................................................................

2. CENTROS EXTRANJEROS................................................................

2.A. GRAN BRETAÑA.............................................................................

2.B. FRANCIA.......................................................................................

2.C. ALEMANIA.....................................................................................

2.D. ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA.....................................................

2.E. JAPÓN..........................................................................................

B. COLECCIONES DOCUMENTALES........................................................

C. ENTREVISTAS.....................................................................................

D. PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS.........................................................

E. BIBLIOGRAFIA...................................................................................

1. CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL...........................................................

1.A. IMÁGENES Y RELACIÓN EXTERIOR.................................................

1.B. INTELIGENCIA Y SERVICIOS SECRETOS..........................................

2. POLITICA EXTERIOR ESPAÑOLA.......................................................

3. POLITICA EXTERIOR DE JAPON........................................................

4. ESPAÑA Y ASIA ORIENTAL...............................................................

5. MEMORIAS Y BIOGRAFIAS..............................................................

6. PUBLICACIONES CONTEMPORANEAS SOBRE JAPÓN EN ESPAÑA......

7. TRABAJOS SIN PUBLICAR...............................................................

INDICE ANALITICO .......................................................................... 15 pp.

Preface

Preface (Stanley G. Payne. Unviersity of Wisconsin-Madison)

Index

Índice temático (Html)

Errata

Html

Presentación

Reviews

- Raanan Rein (March 2004) The International History Review, Vol. XXVI (I): 191-193 pdf

- Alicia Girón, (April 2005) Social Science Japan Journal, Tokyo, Institute of Social Sicence, University of Tokyo & Oxford University Press, Volume 8 (1): pp. 169-172. pdf

- Pedro Ares Oliveira (2003) Bulletin of Portuguese and Japanese Studies, N. 5, Lisbon, Universidade Nova de Lisboa – Cham, Vol. 5: 137-143 pdf

- Bernardita Reyes Churchill (2005) Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde (Journal of the Humanities and Social Sociences of Southeast Asia and Oceanía), Leiden, KITLV, Vol. 160 (2/3): 369:371. pdf