Bulletin of Portuguese- Japanese Studies
BPJS, 2005, 10/11,
243-262
FRANCO’S SPAIN AND THE
JAPANESE EMPIRE (1937-45)
Florentino
Rodao
Universidad
Complutense, Madrid
Relations between Spain
and Japan
were anomalous over the course of the seven years during which the
Sino-Japanese war lasted, because they attained an unprecedented importance
that would not be witnessed for a long time to come after this period. Despite
the Spanish colonisation of the Philippines,
from the time of their expulsion from Japan
in the 17th century, relations between the two nations had never
been significant even after the comprehensive opening up of Japan to the outside world in 1868.
After the defeat by the United States
ended Spanish colonisation in Asia in 1898, Spain’s
scant commercial interest in Japan
not only waned but the Iberian nation also witnessed a conscious reduction in
interest in the region. Ties became minimal, both with regard to the Philippines and especially with the rest of East Asia. As a consequence, contacts between Spain and Japan during the first three
decades of the 20th century were negligible. The most well known
exception being when Spain
represented Japanese interests with the main powers during World War I, the
rest of events not going beyond the scope of the diplomatic milieu.
Mutual perceptions, however, had a greater impact than these strictly
diplomatic relations: both countries had a well defined image of each other. In
a certain way, they were parallel, because both countries were labelled exotic
by the other nation and their contributions did not go beyond the realm of mere
curiosity. For Spain, Japan was situated in the Far
East, with the connotations that this implied and that the name
itself suggested: distant and not Western. It did have some other notable
characteristics. Such as having made the transition from being a territory
susceptible to colonisation in the mid-19th century to the category
of a great imperial power, as was verified by the 1905 defeat of Russia, an
episode that earned Japan widespread admiration amongst several sectors of
Spanish society. The socialist Julián Besteiro, for example, sympathised with
the slogan “Let us Japanise Spain” that was repeated during the I World War, to
highlight the need to follow the example of a country that paid great attention
to education and solidarity, and whose monarchy was perceived as austere. This
fascination with Japan
predominated, over time, amongst the more conservative classes in Spanish
society, such as military men.[244]
Spain’s image in Japan also had
two facets. While on the one hand, Spain
was a European country that belonged to Western civilisation, its weak
colonisation of the Philippines
and the precarious stability of Spanish domestic policies ensured that the
Japanese viewed the Spanish with a certain amount of disdain, in much the same
manner as the northern European nations regarded those of Southern
Europe. Assimilating ideas that were then in vogue about racial
miscegenation during the Arab occupation, the prejudicial effects of hot
climates on the characters of people and other such notions, the overall
panorama of ideas associated with Spain was a melange of an occidental and
orientalist vision: European, and with a glorious history, but nonetheless
static, full of contrasts, despotic, feminine and tending towards violence and
cruelty, as represented in Bizet’s opera Carmen.
Both nations represented the other as semi-Oriental, via contradictory lenses
that enabled each of them, within this civilisational scale that was so
prevalent at the time, to feel superior to the other.
In 1937, when
the wars in Spain and in China happened
to coincide, the Spanish (both Republicans as well as Nationalists) felt, for
the first time in a long while, that they were affected by events that took
place in the territory of the other nation. This reciprocal interest continued
until 1945, although it underwent a dramatic change in nature because, while
the early period was characterised by amicable relations, the final phases of
World War II were marked by Spanish hatred for the Japanese. This study will
analyse this period of renewed attention, focusing upon the Franco supporters
on the Spanish side and the Japanese militarists. Starting with a description
of the events that took place, this article attempts an interpretation based on
perceptions of why such a dramatic change took place, from the initial
friendship to the hatred of later years.
1. The anti-communist alliance
The Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) and the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) were
the two main conflicts that took place before World War II; in addition, they
occurred simultaneously at the two geographical extremes of the Eurasian
continent, as was noted at the time. The quest for allies in similar situations
resulted in both the Spanish nationalists as well as the Japanese militarists
deeming the conflicts to be similar and feeling themselves to be in a parallel
situation, proclaiming that they were engaged in a common struggle against
international communism. When viewed through these lenses, the Spaniards felt the
Japanese triumphs to be their own and the conquests of Chinese cities were
utilised for purposes of domestic propa-[245]ganda. The Japanese militarists
shared this vision, however, they preferred to use the friendship with
Spaniards instead to educate themselves on Spanish soil about the advances in
Soviet armaments, especially with regard to the new M-80 tank.
Japan’s importance in Spain was revealed when, in late 1938, Japan, Italy
and Germany
decided to reinforce the Anti-Comintern Pact. Spain was an obvious candidate to
join but General Franco and his foreign minister, Jordana, resisted such a
move, on account of which these three nations decided to apply pressure
individually. As a consequence, the Japanese representative, with two other
colleagues, coerced Franco separately to sign the Pact, in a demonstration of Japan’s new
status. It was only in May 1939, when the Civil War was already over, that Spain, along with Hungary
and Manchukuo
(the Japanese puppet state), joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. In this manner Japan and Spain became allies although, very
soon after, the political orientation of the anti-Communist countries did an
abrupt volte-face. A mere three months passed before the signing of the
Non-Aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany, that
rendered obsolete the Spanish adherence to the Anti-Comintern.
2. The struggle against democracies
In spite of
the changing significance of having signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, common
Hispano-Japanese interests later expanded as they coincided in the new Axis
drive against democracies. After the Nazi-Soviet agreement and the outbreak of
World War II, both Tokyo as well as Madrid were disoriented.
While Japan revamped its
government and tried to draw closer to the democracies, Spain and Italy
sided vehemently with Finland
in its struggle against the Soviet invasion thus opposing German policy.
Nevertheless, with the German military triumphs, both Madrid
as well as Tokyo once again reinforced their
ties with the Third Reich, following Rome, who
in June 1940, after the fall of France,
entered World War II on the German side.
From the summer of 1940 onwards, this sentiment of participating in a
joint struggle against the same enemies reverberated amongst these erstwhile
signatories to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the result being a new agreement, the
so-called Tripartite Pact, formed again by Japan,
Italy and Germany. This
time they joined their efforts against the democracies aimed especially at
countering the growing involvement of the United States. And so, Spain joined a
month later, albeit secretly, after a meeting between Franco and Hitler in
Hendaye. This Hispano-Japanese political alliance, although an indirect one,
entailed efforts to obtain Navycerts (permits issued by the British Royal Navy
to foreign vessels allowing them to transport goods) and an exchange [246] of
products via a -quite ineffective- Commercial Treaty. Also, when Japan sought to substitute raw materials that
had been blocked by the United States,
a so-called Spanish Economic Mission
was invited along with other delegations from Latin America, apparently in
order to buy mercury, but this Mission
never produced results. In the political sphere, Spain
bet heavily on China
for a final triumph of the pro-Japanese government headed by Wang Jingwei and
in June 1940 the Spanish Economic Mission was the first foreign delegation to
officially visit him. However, apart from the relief to Wang’s government, Madrid’s policy produced bafflement among observers for
going further than the Germans or Italians, who were their diplomatic sponsors
in Asia since the Spanish War, but also than
the backers of Wang, the Japanese military. The Japanese militarists were still
undecided whether to confer diplomatic recognition and rely exclusively on Wang
or to keep on trying to attract the Nationalist Party of Jiang Jie-shi. Efforts
were also made to co-operate in terms of propaganda, both in Latin America as
well as in those areas of Asia that had been occupied by Japan, however
yet again the results were negligible.
Once again, undoubtedly, the results of Hispano-Japanese relations
during the early phases of World War II occurred within the realm of
perceptions. Both nations assumed a parallel posture: they were not directly
involved in the European conflict, however the Japanese and Spaniards alike
enthusiastically desired the triumph of the Axis powers. Furthermore, they were
the two most important trump cards of the Axis powers in their struggle against
the enemy, since Tokyo and Madrid
held the key to the conquest of two crucial posts for the definitive defeat of
the British Empire: Gibraltar and Singapore. Therefore it became
relatively common to simultaneously refer to Spain
and Japan
together during the most victorious moments of the Axis powers, both in Allied
documentation as well as in that of the Axis powers. This association between Spain and Japan
was later reflected on by the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, who
noted in his diary an account of the phone call from his German counterpart,
Joaquim Von Ribbentrop inviting Italy
to join the War against the United
States. Ciano ended his notes with an
unanswered question: “And Spain?”
3. The Pacific War: the assignments
Pearl Harbour put an end to the parallel perceptions
between Spain and Japan: Tokyo
ended up by being involved in the worldwide conflict while Madrid did not. Spain
continued its policy of Non-Belligerence, which could [247] be interpreted as a
step preceding its entry into the war, as was the case of Italy, although
its final outcome was different. The Spanish involvement was at a different
level, which is the reason why the Pacific War once again raised the level of
relations with Japan,
since mutual friendship now began to have definite objectives that were far
more concrete and furthermore, could have been crucial for the result of the
conflict. Tokyo relied upon Spain to provide it with raw materials, to
achieve a greater acceptance in the Philippines, to obtain intelligence
and to represent its interests in the more difficult countries. By means of the
crucial mediation of the Spanish foreign minister, Ramón Serrano Suñer, Spain became involved in operations that Germany or Italy
could not carry out and in this manner Madrid
became the western nation that most assisted the Japanese war efforts.
The impact of this cooperation was uneven. The exchange of raw materials
and Spanish political co-operation to achieve a wider domination over the
Philippine population during the Japanese occupation had varying results. In
the case of the exchange of products it is possible that some purchases of
Spanish goods took place, transported to Japan in ships or in the so-called
“Blockade Runner” submarines, which travelled from one theatre of the conflict
to another. There is evidence of a fair number of unsuccessful attempts but, in
any case, the volume of any such transactions would have been rather small
because the quantities of products to be transported would have been minimal.
As for the occupation of the Philippines,
the Spanish consul in Manila
handed over a list of Spanish leftists for their detention, while the Japanese
strove to propagate statements by Spaniards extolling their achievements. The
Falangists in Manila
managed to attain dominance over the Spanish colony, substituting the hegemony
of pro-Franco oligarchic families suspicious of Fascism but, apart from this,
few benefits were had. The Japanese military police (Kempeitai), for instance,
did not prolong the detention of those Spaniards denounced by the consul in Manila, and Spain never managed to obtain any
important measure that signified a noteworthy favour for the community. The
media in the Philippines
on its part circulated some messages of support from the Spanish
administration, and the Japanese religious policy managed some praise from the
Spanish Catholic missionaries that could help to achieve the acquiescence of
the Filipino people for the military occupation, but its importance was
relative.
Intelligence and the representation of Japanese interests witnessed the
most significant results of this Spanish co-operation. In the case of the
former, Spain
helped significantly in the compilation of secret information thanks to Serrano
Suñer, the foreign minister. The Japanese espionage networks in the United States
had been wrecked following the forced intern[248]ment of ethnic Japanese Americans in War Relocation Camps outside their
habitual living areas on the West Coast. Therefore the Japanese minister in Madrid, Yakichirō
Suma, requested Spanish assistance in order to obtain intelligence about their
main enemy. Serrano Suñer began by handing over some despatches from his
ambassadors and later offered to engage in a joint co-operation where Spain would share
expenses and the Japanese pay the cost of equipment and other additional sums.
This scheme failed within the space of a few months. To head the espionage, on
Spain’s part, the Foreign minister introduced Ángel Alcázar de Velasco, a well
trusted fellow Falangist who had already done some intelligence work, notably
an espionage network in London whilst Cultural Attaché in 1940. He deceived the
British ambassador in Madrid, Samuel Hoare,
but later was unmasked and had returned to Spain.
Throughout 1942, Alcázar de Velasco organised a small spy network
despite the setback of having to dismiss some agents who were preparing for
their assignments on account of being unable to obtain normal American visas.
It was based on various resident Spaniards and others who could get through
border checks, such as diplomats and sailors, and focused on gathering
intelligence in the United
States and was subsequently dubbed
“Tō”. It had at least one agent on US
soil and used the Spanish diplomatic bag, but it severely lacked resources to
work properly, such as a method of receiving instructions from Spain on a
regular basis. Nevertheless, Alcázar de Velasco managed to obtain some useful
information, such as the despatch of numerous supply vessels to the South
Pacific in autumn 1942 somewhat anticipating the Guadalcanal
offensive. The Tō network had
some other more modest successes and according to the index of the Magic Summaries - the daily bulletin of
the most significant decoded messages prepared by the United States’ counter-espionage
service - became the most important source of information for Japanese
diplomacy in quantitative terms. All in all, Japanese intelligence acquired
through Spain
was meagre and not entirely trustworthy; however, due to the lack of
alternatives, the Japanese continued using it until 1944.
The representation of interests in countries at war or without official
relations with Japan
was an undertaking of great magnitude. Spain
assumed this responsibility for the most significant nations, both on account
of their political importance, such as the United
States (with the exception of Hawai’i,
which was entrusted to Sweden)
or for their large expatriate communities, such as Peru
and Brazil.
Representing almost all of the Western Hemisphere except for Guatemala and Mexico,
the task entrusted to Spanish diplomacy was greater than the one accepted by Sweden and Switzerland and therefore an
important opportunity to enhance Spanish diplomacy. The reasons for this [249]
solicitude, however, were directly related to the cover they provided to the
intelligence effort. The forced transfer of Japanese citizens in the United States to War Relocation camps induced Japan
to seek out secret contacts with her subjects in enemy territory and the
pressing need for intelligence seems to have been the reason that Spain was duly
elected to represent Japanese interests. The first telegram about the Japanese
representation from Minister Serrano Suñer to his embassy in Washington also pointed to the intelligence
aspect. In it, he informed the Ambassador of the decision and followed
requesting him to provide information about Spaniards who were not classed as
fifth columnists, so that they could be appointed as representatives throughout
the country. Madrid
and Tokyo saw eye to eye on the issue of
relegating the well-being of the Japanese in the United States in favour of a better
espionage network.
Hispano-Japanese cooperation soon encountered a fair number of
obstacles. The most pressing one was the occupation of the Philippines, the
former colony where Spain still retained important economic interests that were
highly profitable thanks to exports to the United States. In fact the largest
company in the Philippines
had its headquarters in Barcelona
while many wealthy Spanish citizens owned tobacco and sugar plantations. During
the first month of the Pacific War news of Japanese air-attacks and the
destruction in Manila combined with the growing
pressure exerted by the United States
against pro-Axis Spanish temptations had important repercussions in Spain. An
offensive within Franco’s regime was unleashed to undermine the political
position of the Falange party and its most influential member, the Foreign
Minister, Serrano Suñer. He openly acknowledged this to the Japanese Minister
Suma and in May 1942, formally presented a complaint to Tokyo on account of
Japanese press criticism against Spanish colonisation in the Philippines, along
with an official inquiry about the fate of some missionaries in the
Philippines’ Pampanga region.
On its part, the Japanese government felt frustrated due to the
expectations it had nurtured with regard to the Spaniards, especially about the
representation of Japanese expatriates. Tokyo
never received the expected news via Spanish channels about the mistreatment of
Japanese subjects abroad which was so essential for the Japanese propaganda
efforts to showcase racial discrimination against its subjects, one of its
favourite themes. Spanish diplomats and other personnel entrusted with this
representation of interests were reluctant to transmit intelligence messages or
those that were [250] liable to be used for propaganda and, furthermore, they
also collaborated with the Americans to minimise the information about
difficulties, including deaths. It was only when the first vessel of exchange
arrived in Japan, organised jointly by Spain and Switzerland, the leading
representatives of Allied interests in Asia and of Japanese interests in
America, that Japanese propaganda was finally able to use the news on mistreatment
that so greatly needed and, with it, criticisms surfaced about the lack of
dedication on the part of the Spanish diplomats. Moreover, in September 1942,
an important mainstay of friendly relations with Japan
disappeared in Madrid.
The dismissal of the Foreign minister, Serrano Suñer, after the most serious
episode in the confrontation between the Falangists and the conservative
faction opposing to their power and Spain entering the war - the
terrorist attack in the Basque sanctuary of Begoña against the military
conservative Spanish Defence Minister, which caused one death. By then, the
military situation had changed the balance between both countries: Japan’s options had narrowed, while Madrid increasingly felt the need to distance itself from
Tokyo.
The Japanese government was the first to be affected by the Spanish
drift towards neutrality. In Spring 1943, six months after assuming the office
of Foreign Minister, Count Jordana pompously announced at a conference in Barcelona, to which all accredited ambassadors had been
invited, that Spain
was veering towards neutrality. At this time, the switch to neutrality was
still a difficult step to take, due to the power that the Axis supporters still
wielded, especially the Germans and Italians, and thus Tokyo became the scapegoat in the Spanish
volte-face. The tangible demonstration of this Spanish neutrality began via Japan and for this purpose, in late April 1943, Madrid surprised Tokyo
with some measures that abruptly put an end to the climate of friendship and
co-operation that had prevailed up until then. For example, the Ministry of
External Affairs cancelled the project to raise the level of mutual Legations
to Embassies, despite the fact that this measure had already been agreed upon
initially. Likewise, it allowed the press to divulge the news of the execution
by Japan of American aviators who had been captured in China, in
contravention of international laws.
The espionage network continued to function through the official
channels of the Ministry of External Affairs, but it was much more vulnerable.
Increasingly clandestine and based on the personal benefits obtained by some
individuals who had been bribed by Alcázar de Velasco, its information was used
by former minister Serrano Suñer for his own ends, given that he had lost his
office. In the Spring of 1943, the Tō
net started to distribute information pointing to the existence of separate
peace talks between Germany,
Italy and the United States (with Spanish presence), which
threatened a separate agreement between Germany and the Allies, thus
leaving Japanese on their own. The [251] plot aimed ultimately at provoking a
Japanese attack against the Soviet Union, failed once the Japanese discarded
the veracity of the messages and the only consequence was to diminish
additionally the Japanese confidence in Tō
intelligence. Further set-backs were the difficulty in sending new agents to
the Western Hemisphere, the defection of one of the purported war
correspondents sent to the United
States and the detention of the sole
diplomat engaged in working for the network, despite the fact that funds were
available.
While Jordana’s ideas of Neutrality were difficult to implement, attacks
on Japan allowed Spain to
balance its complacency towards Nazi Germany and in summer 1943, General Franco
was by far the most explicit. In the course of a private conversation with the US ambassador, Carlton Hayes, General Franco
assured that there were simultaneously three different conflicts in the world:
the Axis powers against the Soviet Union, the Allies against the Axis and the United States against Japan. Spain
maintained different opinions with regard to each dispute because – according
to Franco - it supported the Axis powers in the first conflict, while in the
second it considered itself to be neutral and in the third favoured the United States against Japan. According to Franco, Japan
had to be defeated because it was basically a nation of barbarians. This
argument had been adapted to suit his interlocutor, because a few days later,
while meeting with the British ambassador, Franco only mentioned two wars.
Nevertheless, the message was clear and Washington,
on the basis of this conversation, now became aware of this friction between
the theoretical allies, and could surmise how it could be utilised for military
objectives.
In September 1943, the so-called Laurel
Incident provided one such opportunity. Similarly to other territories
within its proclaimed Sphere of
Co-Prosperity of Greater East Asia, Japan
had decided to formally grant the Philippines its independence. After
this proclamation, Minister Suma insistently requested that Foreign Minister
Jordana send a telegram of felicitation to José P. Laurel, the President of
this pro-Japanese government in Manila.
The Spanish minister tarried in sending this message, however his deputy, the
Director-General of Foreign Policy, José María Doussinague, without the
minister’s prior knowledge and apparently in order to defend Spanish interests
in the Philippines, sent the requested telegram. It was not an explicit
recognition of the pro-Japanese government, as it used vague expressions about
the traditional amicable relations between Spain
and the Philippines,
however it was addressed to “The President of the Philippine Government”.
Later, Foreign Ministry officials asked the Japanese that the telegram not be
used for propaganda purposes, but this request went unheeded and the channels
of Axis propaganda divulged its contents, manipulating it [252] as though it
were a formal recognition of the Laurel
government. At this point, Washington
deliberately exaggerated its reaction and caused the gravest strain between Spain and the United States during the war. For a
start, it issued orders prohibiting its senior officials from maintaining any
sort of contact with their Spanish counterparts, thus not permitting the latter
to explain the official version proffered by Madrid. Later, it surreptitiously threatened
the perplexed Spanish government, and this in the light of the official silence
was soon compounded by news in the press pointing out a qualitative change in
the US
position. The press reported rumours
that a Spanish invasion in order to launch an attack against the Axis powers
from Spanish territory was being considered. At the same time, periodicals such
as the New York Times included
editorials highlighting how illogical such a pro-Axis move by Spain was at this stage in the War, while
rumours circulated about plans for an invasion of Spain. In this manner, Washington managed to
keep the Spanish government up against the ropes.
The Laurel Incident was
provoked by Washington in order to benefit
from the poor Spanish relations with Japan and based on its
counterintelligence. Knowing Franco’s opposition to Japan
and after having decoded secret Japanese messages indicating internal
differences within Franco’s government about the sending of the Laurel telegram, Washington
viewed the situation as an opportunity to ensure that Spanish enmity towards Japan was
transposed upon the European scenario. By making Madrid
nervous, the United States
sought to obtain tangible results, especially to curb the export to the Third
Reich of tungsten, a metal that was vital for producing armaments and which
Hitler was only able to obtain then in Spain
and Portugal.
Washington used its far more advanced technological knowledge (the interception
of diplomatic messages from a total of 32 countries, which included enemy as
well as neutral nations and allies) in order to realise its political
objectives, as is suggested by the different versions of the decoding of the
Japanese message referring to Spanish nervousness in the light of a possible
propagation by the Axis powers of this congratulatory message. The Department
of State found an unexpected hindrance when the Spanish Foreign Minister,
Jordana, assumed its authority without revealing chinks in his armour. The
practical results of the Laurel Incident,
finally, were meagre, and the pressure to cease sales of tungsten continued for
some more months until Madrid
formally renounced sales and accepted other Allied demands in the Spring of
1944.
Madrid immediately sharpened its
anti-Japanese stance after Jordana saved the day behind the scenes of the Laurel Incident. In December 1943, when
Spain was seeking a solution to the boatloads of Italian refugees that arrived
in Spanish ports after the fall of Mussolini both the pro-Allied [253] Badoglio
Government in Rome as well the Social Republic in Saló demanded that they be
handed over. Madrid
unsuccessfully proposed, as an intermediary plan, that these warships be used
against the Japanese.
The next step took place in February 1944
when these discrepancies surfaced in public via a news item that The Times classified as “eye-opening
news”.
On the basis of information -prepared in
Madrid but dated ostensibly in Buenos Aires- about Argentine citizens who were
concerned about the disappearance of the Spanish language in the Philippines
and about the mistreatment of the Spanish bishop on the island of Guam, the
Falangist daily ‘¡Arriba!’ published
a curious commentary on its front page. It openly recognised its past errors
for having defended the military adventures of the Japanese empire. It is very
rare to discern a sense of ‘mea culpa’
in a dictatorship, even more so when manifested in its most totalitarian
periodical, for which reason the article in ‘¡Arriba!’ illustrates the complete volte-face of Madrid’s political
stance on Japan - and its perception. From being one of the most ardent
defenders of a Japanese victory, the Falangist newspaper started to openly
criticise Japan,
being the first to undergo the volte-face.
4. Intentions to declare war in
order to survive in the post-war scenario
Apparently, from summer 1944 onwards, Franco resigned himself to the
idea that the Allies would win the World War II, although still without
considering that Germany
would suffer an unconditional defeat. In the meantime, German troops abandoned
the Spanish frontier in France
and for the first time American bombers had the range to easily attack Japan after the capture of Saipan and Guam, in Micronesia.
This certainty of the definitive decline of the Axis powers coincided with the
appointment of a new Foreign Minister, José Félix de Lequerica. He inherited
the strains with Japan, but
proceeded in a completely opposite manner, because while Jordana was mortified
by this volte-face with Japan
and sought ultimately to improve relations, the new Foreign Minister was
radically different, seeking to use the problems with Japan to strut
before the Allies. Lequerica, therefore, gave Japan maximum importance by
immediately meeting with the Japanese minister Suma and airing his new policy
in the media. The official National Press Delegation sent three notes shortly
after to the newspapers ordering them to attack the Japanese empire; headlines
appeared such as: “[…] Criteria Openly Favourable to the United States in its War against Japan” or
“Against the Anti-Christian and Anti-Western Japanese Policy”. These early
anti-[254]Japanese instructions show
that Lequerica intended to utilise Japan as a trump card for his
post-war period.
Madrid was inclined to go beyond the articles and
tense relations with Tokyo
to the limit. It was not the only nation to do so; during Autumn 1944 and
Winter 1945, other countries - such as Argentina
and Turkey - that had
formerly been pro-Axis definitively aligned themselves with the Allies and
broke relations with Japan.
Madrid did not know how to disentangle itself from
the increasingly intense doubts about how to utilise the Japan card in
the best possible manner until March 1945. Then, after the widespread
destruction of Manila and the death of at least two hundreds Spaniards, there
was no other option than to take it into consideration and act urgently, but
Madrid maintained doubts about how far it should go.
Madrid first tested foreign reaction. The
first news of the deaths in Manila given in a
brief report by the Spanish news agency EFE commenting upon an article in Newsweek about the massacres in Manila and the suffering
of the Spanish community there. At the end of the despatch, the report stressed
that the atrocities in Manila could well be a
reason for Spain to declare
War upon Japan and that it
would thus automatically become an ally of the United
States and the United Kingdom. Later, the Spanish press was authorised to
comment upon this despatch, as were the press correspondents resident in Spain, while a
massive press campaign circulated the worst comments about the Japanese,
portraying them as Asian barbarians.
Some days after, on 17 March 1945, the Spanish government decided to
withdraw its protection of Japanese interests. This decision was intended
merely as a first step in a chain of events that would vary in accordance with
their impact. This done, Minister Lequerica had an informal dinner with the
British military attaché, Windam W. Torr, in which “somewhat light-hearted
remarks” were made about future measures against Japan. Lequerica said: “It looks
as if we are going to declare war on Japan” and, when questioned about
the timing of such a move, responded, “Pretty soon I expect. We must get it
before Portugal”.
Likewise, questioned about the casus
belli, Lequerica “shrugged his shoulders” and said: “Oh, well, Franco has
always hated the Japanese”. Torr then asked: “What about the atrocities in the
Spanish Consulate?” to which Lequerica replied: “Oh, yes, we might well use
them”.
The impact of this new resolution against Japan was less favourable than
expected, lasting only a few weeks. On 1 March, the United
States [255] finished drawing up a policy based on the
suggestions made by Franco and Lequerica on this matter to the US ambassador,
Hayes at his farewell audience, in autumn 1944. The brief concluded that the
possible benefits for the Allies of Madrid breaking off relations with Japan were negligible and, therefore, Washington discarded any
interest in it. Upon hearing of Spanish intentions, then, the American
government declared that Spanish decisions against Japan
were solely the responsibility of Madrid
and would not affect them in any way.
The United Kingdom also
clearly rebuffed the possibility of this entrance into the war on the part of Madrid, assuring that, in any case, there was still time
to declare war on Germany.
At a popular level, the reactions were even harsher. For example El Popular in Mexico
City published a sarcastic comment linking the move to Spanish
intentions of becoming a founding member of the new League of Nations: “Franco
would declare War on Japan…Japan on Germany…Germany on Spain,
and everyone would go to San Francisco!”
Amongst the regimes that had friendly relations with Madrid, the reaction was milder even though
it was aimed at calming Spanish exasperation, partly on account of these
nations own interests. Buenos Aires
was the only regime that clearly identified itself with Spanish desires of
declaring war, since it was in a similar situation of doing a volte-face and
also needed to ingratiate itself with the victors. After having spearheaded the
opposition to US pressures during the conflict, Argentina
declared War on Japan on 27
March, and was followed shortly thereafter by Chile,
its main ally in this resistance to US influence. The Vatican requested the journalist Manuel Aznar to use his
influence over Minister Lequerica in order to reduce tension with Japan and to
ensure that the situation did not worsen. The Catholic Church was clearly
concerned about the possible consequences for the Spanish missionaries working
in territories controlled by the Japanese authorities, including the Japanese
archipelago itself, China, Micronesia and
Indo-China. Portugal’s case
was slightly different, Lisbon had been on the
verge of declaring War on Japan
in 1943, using the occupation of East Timor as
a casus belli as well as being
encouraged by American promises of compensation. However the United States managed to obtain authorisation
for air bases in the Azores but later ignored the Japanese garrison in Timor during its northward advance, therefore in March
1945 the possibility of a military alliance with the United [256] States was a
forgotten issue. During the Battle for Manila, some Portuguese were also killed and Madrid sought their
fellow Iberians to act jointly. Lisbon, however,
was no longer interested in declaring war on Japan,
noting also that the population of Macao
could suffer greatly as a result of any declaration of this kind. Moreover, Portugal could not accept following Spanish
foreign policy, even less so in East Asia,
where the Portuguese were the ones who should have been taking the initiative.
Japan’s reaction was irrelevant to Madrid. Since Spain sought to draw closer to the Allies, Japan had a minimal margin for manoeuvre, as Madrid was yet another
of many cases of progressive enmity. Tokyo’s aim
was simply to extend as much as possible the time during which the Iberian Peninsula could be utilised for its war efforts,
such as the work of whatever espionage remained to be done. The same thing had
happened in Tangiers a year earlier, when Spain ordered that all foreigners
were to leave: the Japanese diplomats overstayed every date limit that had been
set, until the threat of the use of force obliged them to leave the African
outpost. The Japanese Legation, then, sought to avoid Spanish retaliation by
offering a bribe: it proposed paying indemnities for the victims in the Philippines in
such a way that the money could be routed to members of the government.
The unfavourable impact of his bellicose proclamations made Franco
ponder once again upon these measures and to consider the convenience of
checking this irritation. Thus, the only measure that went through at the end
of the representation of Japanese interests was the breaking of relations with Japan on 12
April 1945, a
logical consequence of the step taken three weeks earlier, which once again
gave rise to some anti-Japanese articles. But nothing else occurred. And in
May, the first articles in the Spanish press about Franco’s “military
inhibitions” during the conflict appeared, which would be repeated throughout
his regime.
This was doubly false, because General Franco had tried to intervene
directly in the conflict on two occasions, in 1940 with the Axis powers - which
has been well researched years ago - and in 1945 with the Allies. And the
reason why Spain
did not enter the conflict appears to have been similar on both occasions:
neither Hitler, nor Roosevelt, nor Churchill wanted Franco on the winning side
once they achieved victory.
5. Reasons for the volte-face
There are always good reasons for declaring a war, at least for those
who favour it. But the casus belli
offered by Minister Lequerica to the British attaché, that is, Franco’s hatred
of the Japanese, is extremely interesting, since [257]it reflects a different reasoning. While the possibility
of declaring war on the Soviet Union was reasoned utilising principled beliefs,
against Japan the argument was different, since the casus belli of hate enters the realm of informal ideology, or what
Keohane and Goldstein consider to be “world views”, forming part of the
symbolism of culture, in a category that is also different from the so-called
“causal beliefs”.
These proposals for war also sound strange when one observes relations
from the perspective of the conflict and the excellent perception of Japan in Spain merely two years earlier.
During the 1940-42 period, the Japanese mindset had been widely utilised by the
Spanish regime. Given that armies needed the blindest possible obedience to
orders issued by superiors and that soldiers should risk their lives in battle,
the representation of the samurai had been a recurrent theme. The bushido, an obvious example of inventing
tradition, was adapted to circumstances and in continuous use; the book, for
instance, was reprinted in 1940 under the auspices of the Japanese Legation and
with a prologue by the founder of the Spanish Legion, General Millán Astray.
The representations of Japan
as a friendly nation that was anti-Communist and anti-Allied were two powerful
reasons to create an exaggerated perception of Japan
in order to seek out the parallels between both nations, to the point of
generating an ideal image of Japan
resembling that of the image of the Soviet Union.
A fair number of leftists (not only Communists) formed their perception of the
Soviet Union based almost exclusively on wishful-thinking, and vague
references, without even knowing Russian or having facts to curtail their
flights of fancy. Something similar resulted in the ideal perception of Japan during
the Spanish War and their post-war period. However, the idealised image of Japan proved short, since the decision not to
follow the German blitzkrieg upon the Soviet Union in 1941, stopped that
idealization of Japan.
When Japan began to
suffer its chain of defeats in the Pacific War, the positive images of Japan fell by
the wayside one by one. If earlier the Japanese had been considered to be a
technologically advanced nation, it was now thought that this was because they
had been taught to imitate. If earlier Japan
had been viewed as a developed country and a bridge between the “Asian
barbarians” and the civilised world, the image of Asia
was placed above that of the Japanese, who now became part of the Yellow Peril. Their erstwhile image as
anti-Communists was minimised by their act of not declaring War on the Soviet
Union, a decision later considered to be an example of “Asian
intelli[258]gence”, , presumably a tendency towards deceitfulness that was
innate in every Asian -in this case, Russians and Japanese. Finally, the
traditional images of the delicate geisha and the patriotic samurai changed
their meaning and were now seen through the prism of the “Asian hordes”,
characterised by treachery and cruelty.
This drastic process of change took place as part of the changes in
times of War. However, it did not take place in the case of Italy or Germany,
despite the fact that the military fates of the European Axis countries took a
turn for the worse even before that of Japan. Great
Britain, as already noted, suggested that if Spain was going to declare war, it would be more
useful if it declared war on Germany,
which at that time was still fighting. The Spanish change of policy was clearly
linked with racial questions, because Madrid
underwent a radical process of a change in the perception of Japan that can
be understood only through the racial overtones. These resembling those of the United States against Japan, which has been described by John W. Dower in his
seminal work War without mercy. If
the Fascists and Nazis were the enemy, American soldiers could assume that
their opponents on the other side of the front were Germans or Italians who had
been forced to fight, since it was clear that there were also anti-Nazi Germans
or anti-Fascist Italians. However, if the enemy was identified as Japanese, the
possibility of conceiving of a Japanese who did not agree with the
proclamations of their government was more remote and, therefore, the
possibility of demonstrating magnificence or compassion was comparatively less.
Just like that comment made by Franco to Ambassador Hayes, or that of Lequerica
to Torr, the reasoning was basically cultural and located in the realm of
civilisation. When arguing, this kind of dispute allowed instant changes and
can explain how the volte-face was accepted among the Spanish population, but
it can apply also to improving relations. In fact, one of the main surprises of
the immediate post-war period was the instant collaboration between Americans
and Japanese; the exceedingly rapid manner in which both contenders buried the
hatchet of war.
US soldiers reflected an ideology that
was essentially an orientalist one with regard to Japan, tending to see it as a
static, feminine, despotic, savage country and, consequently, one that was full
of contrasts. The Spanish government shared these ideas and pondered upon the
convenience of utilising them, as it did in fact do, albeit with lesser
intensity. In fact, these orientalist ideas were the sole connecting thread
that continued in relations between the initial period of friendship and the
latter one of hate. At times, they highlighted alternatively the positive and
the negative representations about Japan. The period of friendship
could have made one think that the images of barbarism and those related with
the Yellow Peril had disappeared
[259] when, in reality, they were simply latent. Contrary to the perception of
the Germans or Italians, whose nationality was merely another bit of
information about them, the Japanese were viewed first and foremost as
Japanese, and then viewed as allies, at the beginning of the war, or as
enemies, at the end of it.
This prevailing mindset dominated the general context of relations
between Spain and Japan. However,
this seems excessive. Supposedly, one of the reasons was the lack of mutual
contact, however, it is necessary to likewise highlight one difference that
could also explain why the changes with regard to the perception of Japan on the
part of the Spanish government were so brusque: a lack of experts. Japan had two
universities that imparted courses in Spanish with Spanish professors since the
late 19th century. Meanwhile the decision makers in Madrid could only avail themselves of some missionaries
and of the opinions of one diplomat or another who had resided for a
considerable time in Japan
(however with no prior preparation) while taking political decisions. After
receiving new inputs, the decision making process was different to the Japanese
one. Tokyo
could count upon experts from whom it received advice and, in general, this
would moderate any intentions of doing an overly abrupt volte-face in political
decisions. Madrid,
however, only relied upon a few well-informed people, i.e. knowledgeable
parties.
Beyond additional advice (the missionaries lived outside Madrid in general), these knowledgeable parties seem to
have been the leading figures in moulding the opinions about Japan that prevailed in Spain. Admiral
Carrero Blanco, who wrote many articles in the press about Japan, seems to
have been one of them, especially during the period of friendship, as well as
Lequerica in 1944-45 and, specially, general Franco. Irrespective of whether
there is any truth in this or not, Foreign Minister Lequerica was famous
amongst the Allies in Spain
for his pro-Axis attitudes; there was a wide spread anecdote of a turkey that
he slaughtered while ambassador in Paris to
celebrate the attack on Pearl
Harbour. His need to
establish his credibility as a reliable foreign minister in his drive toward
managing a better treatment of Spain
after the war ended could have disposed him to assume a more confrontational
posture, especially against Japan.
This was
also the case with Franco, as the conversation with Torr suggests. Franco
revealed himself to be a passionate orientalist with regard to Japan, as is evident from his comments about Japan during
and after the war. During the triumphal period of the Japanese empire, the Generalissimo declared that the basic
reason for these triumphs was the limitless power of endurance of the Japanese
soldier who was capable of surviving only on a daily bowl of rice and still be
able to complete long marches. In 1959, Franco revealed his belief about the
possibility of Christianising the Japanese [259] nation after being convinced
by the Jesuit Superior, father Jose Arrupe. Undoubtedly, Franco perceived Japan through the eyes of his Moroccan
experience, and probably interpreted its waning military destiny as a
confirmation of a rule that, until that time, Japan had been the only nation to challenge:
“East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. At the end of
the World War II, General Franco (and the deceased English writer Rudyard
Kipling) were not the only ones to think in this manner.
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