JAPAN AND THE AXIS, 1937-8:
Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo
Florentino Rodao
Journal of Contemporary History. ISSN
0022-0094.
SAGE
Publications, Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore
and Washington DC. Vol 44 (3), 427-443.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009409104117
Two protracted wars coincide
Franco demands recognition
The Manchukuo connection
Abreviations
Abstract
Japan’s
invasion of China in 1937,
as in the case of the invasion of Ethiopia
two years earlier and of the ongoing civil war in Spain, quickly provoked a response
from the major powers. It also created
special problems for the principal European dictators. Germany
and Italy had taken a clear
position on behalf of intervention in Spain,
but initially continued good relations with the governments of both China and Japan,
whereas the Soviet Union, which was intervening on the opposite side in Spain, was also an East Asian power and faced
the question of equivalent intervention in China against the Japanese
invasion. When Franco’s new Spanish
Nationalist regime later requested recognition by Japan,
its initiative both pointed up the potential contradictions in the East Asian
policies of Berlin and Rome
and posed a new quandary for Tokyo. For the latter, this also involved the
lingering problem of the international recognition of Japan’s puppet state of Manchukuo,
heretofore recognized only by El Salvador,
the Vatican and Japan
itself. The way in which these dilemmas were resolved would play a role in the
eventual alignment of Germany,
Italy and Japan.
The twin issues of the recognition of Manchukuo and of the mutual interaction of the
contemporary struggles in China
and Spain
have largely been overlooked by historians, who tend to focus on the direct
relations of the great powers. Italian
policy in East Asia has generally been ignored, and with that the limited
impact of the Spanish war in that region, together with Franco’s request for
recognition by Japan and Germany’s eventual abandonment of the Chinese
Nationalist regime.
Two protracted
wars coincide
The Japanese government followed the
war in Spain with some
interest, though it was a very secondary issue for Tokyo.
Relations with the Spanish Republic had generally been poor, since the latter’s
representative in Geneva, Salvador de Madariaga,
had led the struggle for sanctions by the League in condemnation of the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria, to the extent of earning the moniker “Don
Quijote of Manchuria.” Subsequently, the
victories of the new Popular Fronts in Spain
and France had raised the
specter of a possible popular front in China, as well, which would unite
the major forces against the Japanese.
In 1936, the military insurrection in Spain
took place in the immediate aftermath of the abortive Japanese military coup of
February 1936, raising a certain note of apprehension in Tokyo,
which at first simply tried to gather information about the situation in the Iberian peninsula.
An American diplomat judged the attitude of the Japanese press to the
Spanish conflict as “studiously neutral in tone.” When the magazine Kaizo (Reconstruction) organized a debate about the issue, most
participants analyzed the limited data available and tended to focus on Great Britain’s concern to maintain control of
Gibraltar, which was frequently the only name to appear on Japanese maps of the
Iberian peninsula. The only participant to offer a personal
opinion sided with the Republican government on the grounds of its legitimacy
and speculated about the difficulties for the British
empire if the “revolutionaries” (in the case referring not to the
leftist revolutionaries but to the counterrevolutionary rebels) won.
The increasing internationalization of
the Spanish war was helpful to Japanese policy in several ways: it focused
attention on western Europe, diverted potential arms exports from China and diverted British attention from Asia. Similarly,
Soviet involvement in Spain
combined with the effort to come to terms with France,
also diverted Soviet attention from Asia. Within the Japanese government, however,
various ministries revealed somewhat divergent interests.
For the Japanese foreign ministry, the
Spanish war long remained remote, the only pressing problem at first being the
fact that the head of the Spanish legation in Tokyo, Santiago Méndez de Vigo, swore
allegiance to the insurgent cause, raising problems of protocol. “What should be done with Méndez de Vigo if a
garden-party is organized?,” mused a French diplomat in Tokyo. The possibility of Japanese
recognition of Franco was raised, however, by Tokyo’s signature of Hitler’s Anti-Comintern
Pact in November 1936. At that time Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō
(following Japanese usage, the family name comes first) informed the Privy
Council that the Spanish war provided further evidence of the Soviet Union’s
efforts to subvert other countries, but the Japanese government nonetheless did
not seriously consider recognition of Franco and the foreign ministry limited
its response to canvassing other governments about their own views.
Ambassador Santiago Méndez de Vigo
The interest of Japanese army leaders
in Spain
was more noteworthy. The semi-autonomous
Kwantung Army in Manchukuo, facing the Soviet Union, was concerned to collect information,
especially after the extent of Soviet intervention became clear. The embassy in
Paris dispatched Captain Nishiura Susumu ostensibly to learn about German
tactics, but in fact he concentrated on studying Soviet and anti-Soviet
weapons, visiting several fronts with particular interest in gathering data on
the T-26 tank, the basic Red Army tank (some of which were also being sent to
China), and also of the improvised anti-tank device created by the Spanish
Nationalists, which several years later, after the Finnish war, would become
internationally known as the “Molotov cocktail.” A second mission by two
Japanese officers assigned to the embassy in Rome
also visited Spain and
focused on Soviet weapons, but went well beyond their mission by expressing
their support of the Nationalists and their hope that Japan would soon recognize the
Franco government.
These divergent attitudes reflected
differences within the Japanese government and underlined the weak position of
the foreign ministry. The “Shidehara
policy,” which emphasized cooperation with western powers and conciliation with
China,
was increasingly challenged by the military.
The perennial criticism of the foreign ministry as representative of the
“old politics” became stronger after the Japanese military successes in Manchuria after September 1931. Diplomats were accused of undermining Japan’s true interests, of being reluctant to
cooperate with other institutions, of returning from long stays abroad as
semi-foreigners and, finally, of not focusing on China, the key strategic zone. Criticism mounted further after the
ministry’s chief spokesman, Shiratori Toshio, spoke publicly in favor of
military attacks of Manchuria, while opposing
to the official stance of his ministry. As a result, the government began to
give some international tasks to other ministries, while independent offices
outside the foreign ministry were set up in China and elsewhere. By the time that the war broke out in Spain, military initiatives had begun to
infringe more and more on Japanese diplomacy, leading among other things to the
signing of Hitler’s Anti-Comintern Pact, as well as to the independent military
missions to Spain. Such interests also promoted the visit to Germany
in September 1936 of Prince Chichibu, younger brother of Emperor Hirohito.
During 1937, however, a new government
headed by General Hayashi Senjuro seemed to pull back from closer relations
with Germany
and steered policy toward the Spanish war firmly in line with the objectives of
the Non-Intervention Committee. Moreover, in March 1937 a sometime language
instructor in Osaka,
José Luis
Alvarez Taladriz, was appointed by the Spanish Republican
government as new Chargé d’Affaires there.
This nonetheless failed to solve the issue of protocol in the Spanish legation, because
Spanish diplomats who supported Franco, with the assistance of the Italian
embassy, managed to keep Alvarez Taladriz from entering the premises, and Japanese
police refused to interfere. The Spanish
Nationalist representatives concentrated their work on the Tokyo
legation, closing the consulate general in Kobe (which would not be re-opened until the
1990s), keeping their doors locked and removing external signs of identity on
their building, while patrolling its garden with guard dogs. After two months,
however, the Francoist diplomats began to run out of funding and sought to
negotiate, demanding payment of 94,000 Yen in accumulated salaries, a guaranteed
Japanese government loan and return tickets to Spain.
Asahi Shimbun reports
When the fighting flared in north China
in July, the militant Chinese response surprised the Japanese. The Chinese government’s abandonment of its
long-standing slogan, “First internal pacification, then external resistance,”
to concentrate on national resistance rendered obsolete the initial Japanese
intention of limiting the zone of conflict to north of the Yellow
River.
To Francisco José del Castillo,
the only Francoist representative remaining in Tokyo,
war in China
was a blessing. His relations improved
with the formation of the new government led by Konoye Fumimaro and its foreign
minister Hirota Koki, who had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. The conflict in China would soon lead the new government to
reexamine its policy toward Spain,
its major concern being the reaction of the western powers to the new war in East Asia. The
initial responses were not overly hostile to Japan,
but Soviet signature of a Non-Aggression Pact with China on 21 August 1937 raised the specter of
Soviet intervention. This also evoked
for the Japanese government a parallel with the war in Spain, since it blamed both
conflicts on the influence of Communism.
For the first time, the Spanish war began to take on some importance for
Tokyo, as
Shiozaki Hiroaki asserts. [9]
The situation in Tokyo
improved rapidly for Del Castillo, who was successful in obtaining a loan from
the Augustinian order in China. He soon received assistance from Eduardo Herrera
de la Rosa, a former Spanish military attaché who had remained in Tokyo and enjoyed numerous
contacts. These informed him of the
“renewed interest in the Spanish conflict from the /Japanese/ Army and Navy,”
as well as among “young personnel” in the foreign ministry. Herrera was therefore able to help Del
Castillo establish links with high officials, as well as to avoid disapproval
of Del Castillo’s public declaration that the earlier proposal to negotiate
with Spanish Republicans had been no more than a delaying tactic. When the Republican chargé Alvarez Taladriz
offered him the previously requested amount to hand over the legation compound,
Del Castillo refused, while the foreign ministry declared that it would not
require him to do so.
Meanwhile, Franco’s representative in Rome, Pedro García Conde, discussed the issue of Japan’s
recognition of his government with the Japanese ambassador there. When the
latter told him that a majority of Japanese now favored this, García Conde
asserted inaccurately that he had received instructions to press the matter, a
conversation which, combined with the recent agreement between Nanjing and
Moscow and the insistence of Giacinto Auriti, the Italian ambassador in Tokyo,
had some effect on the Japanese government.
Soon afterward, it indicated that the Spanish Nationalists would
officially be granted belligerent status, giving them virtual equality with the
Republican regime, but Franco’s representatives then began to press for full
recognition.
Franco demands
recognition
This was a bold move, for the chances of
gaining such favor from the Japanese government were hard to gauge. The demand was supported by most of the small
number of Spaniards resident in Japan, most of them members of the Catholic
missionary community, many of these in turn Jesuits in Japan’s Pacific
islands. In Tokyo, Franco’s request would be certain to
receive support from the leaders of the Army and Navy (especially the latter)
and from younger diplomats such as Yosano Shigeru, who had been assigned to
deal with Del Castillo. Yosano was the
son of the fiery poet Yosano Akiko, who decades earlier had written a
controversial poem protesting the conscription of her brother for the war with Russia. There were also important elements opposing
the Spanish demand, such as José Muñoz Peñalver, long-standing professor of
Spanish literature at the Tokyo
University for Foreign
Studies, whose students had formed an alumni association. Del Castillo also identified as opponents
several key figures in the emperor’s entourage and referred to the fear among
some officials that Japan
was going too far in aligning itself with Germany
and Italy.
The opinion of Foreign Minister Hirota
is the hardest to evaluate. After the
Japanese defeat in 1945, the International Military Tribunal would sentence him
to death for actions taken in 1937-38, charging him with “overall conspiracy,”
“failure to prevent atrocities in China,” and for having been
“derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action
be taken to end the atrocities.” Hirota
is known to have had close links with the Black Ocean Society, a pioneer
ultra-nationalist association, and to have believed strongly in Japan’s need for a “special position” in China. He had earlier headed the foreign ministry
from 1933 to 1935, when western nations were warned not to interfere with
Japanese policy in China, a declaration considered an East Asian parallel to
the Monroe Doctrine. After the abortive
military coup of 26 February
1936, Hirota had become prime minister for a year, and in this
period had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, returning to government once more in
Konoye’s cabinet. When he became foreign
minister once more, his spokesman gained international attention by declaring
that the world was divided between “have and have-not nations.” And following Konoye’s recommendation to
reform the foreign ministry, he announced that he favored assigning to it new
personnel from other ministries. However, Hirota was also concerned to fend off
new discussions in the Diet about creating a new China department outside the
foreign ministry. His main concern was
to retain as much influence as possible over affairs in China and he opposed further links with Berlin and Rome
which might interfere with this objective.
Though Konoye personally favored
recognition of Franco and enjoyed a long Friendship with Herrera de la Rosa,
even to the extent of providing him with special items to improve his health during
the Pacific war, the prime minister’s contribution to the recognition process
was only marginal. He altogether failed
to live up to hopes that he would control the military, spending his first
weeks in office in futile internal disputes, most of which he lost. Military leaders soon ignored him, providing
no information about their own plans and boycotting his efforts to mediate with
China. Konoye soon acknowledged that “I have very
little control over things,” and contributed little to the debate over policy
regarding Spain,
about which Del Castillo was able to learn a certain amount through Herrera,
who gained information indirectly from Konoye’s wife and from his secretary.
Britain
and France retained some
influence in Japan’s
decision-making. Distrust was reciprocal; the British ambassador, Robert
Craigie, reported an atmosphere of “mutual antipathy” between London
and Tokyo, and the new Japanese ambassador to Paris, for example, reported in November 1937 that “Britain,
while posing as a neutral, was aiding Chinese resistance.” But the Japanese government was concerned to
avoid anything that might worsen relations with the western powers, and in
spite of the lack of contacts –Craigie’s first information concerning possible
recognition of Franco merely amounted to a press clipping-, Hirota wished to do
nothing to provoke either London or Paris, and opposed
recognizing Franco before the latter did so.
On the Spanish issue, the Konoye
government valued the opinion of Berlin most of
all, while the latter sought to maintain an equilibrium between its interests
in China and Japan. At the time that the war began, Germany was the main supplier of arms and
military advisers to China
and had minor economic interests in Manchukuo. Hitler’s government proclaimed strict
neutrality and imposed similar terms on its press, while downplaying Japanese
claims of Soviet responsibility for the new conflict. The possibility of hostilities between Tokyo
and Moscow placed an entirely new construction on the Anti-Comintern Pact, as
German diplomats noted, one of them later writing, “The effect of exerting
pressure on Russia, which was certainly welcome with Hitler, was reduced to
insignificance by this adventure.”
German policy was also subject to
internal conflict, since the role of the Foreign Ministry was increasingly
challenged in various ways by the Nazi Party’s Aussenpolitisches Amt (Foreign Affairs Office) and its Auslandsorganisation, the party
organization abroad. For example, the
leading Nazi diplomat and German ambassador to London, the strongly pro-Japanese Joachim von
Ribbentrop, had played a major role in negotiating the Anti-Comintern Pact but
remained the bête noire of
professional diplomats. Policy lines
were not clearly defined, but even Nazi Party leaders concerned with foreign
affairs were uncertain about the level of the Communist threat to China
and the long-term consequences of the Japanese military initiative. Given this uncertainty, Berlin
initially refused the request of Franco’s representatives that it assists in
obtaining formal recognition from Tokyo,
though there was some sentiment for providing encouragement. There was
certainly no interest in promoting Japanese influence in Spain, which might reduce that of Germany. The German embassy in Tokyo did nothing to expedite Franco’s request for recognition, leading Del
Castillo to complain that it “lost too much time in consultations and
exchanging opinions, and refrained from participating at the most appropriate moments.” The only exception was the German military
attaché Eugen Ott, who supported the Spanish petition; Del Castillo reportedly
stemmed “purely from personal friendship” but probably it was decided out of
political reasoning.
The Italian regime had less
influence in Tokyo, but did not suffer from
internal differences, since it experienced its policy turnover in Asia before
than Germany. In 1931 Mussolini had joined other European
spokesmen in denouncing the invasion of Manchuria and even after his own war in
Ethiopia
wrote that the Japanese were a great menace to civilization and the white
race. Nonetheless his policy had begun
to change as early as 1934, when relations improved with the exchange of new
ambassadors, Giacinto Auriti to Tokyo and
Sugimura Yotaro to Rome. They both worked to convince their
governments of the benefits of mutual rapprochement and the benefit to Italy of a pro-Japanese policy in Asia. Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia
resulted in censure by the League of Nations equivalent to that earlier
experienced by Japan, while
both powers were increasingly at odds with the British
empire. Concern for greater
cooperation increased in both Rome and Tokyo, and in November 1936 the latter proposed that Italy reopen its consulate in Mukden, while Japan would downgrade its legation in Addis Ababa to consular
status, in recognition of the Italian conquest.
Later, in a discussion with Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, Ambassador
Sugimura praised Italian intervention in Spain. Soon afterward, when the “Sian incident”
resulted in doubt about the further determination of the Chinese premier Jiang
Jieshi to fight the Communists, both Tokyo and Rome reacted with
alarm. Finally, a minor clash between
Japanese and Russian troops along the Amur River in June 1937, only weeks
before the Marco Polo
Bridge incident, led Ciano to observe
to Sugimura that this reminded him of the anti-Communist struggle in Spain
and was not likely to be speedily resolved.
After outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War,
Italy policy eventually
moved nearer that of Japan. The initial stance was neutrality, because of
significant Italian commercial interests and missionary activity in China, as well as the existence of good
relations with Nanjing
and the role of Italian air force instructors with Chinese forces. To draw Rome
closer, the Japanese government publicly proposed that Italy sign the Anti-Comintern Pact, privately
suggesting a secret addendum which would combine Italian neutrality in China with greater bilateral military
cooperation with Japan. The Italian response grew increasingly
positive, and on 23 August Ciano noted in his Diary that new planes requested
by China
would not be provided. There was
increasing awareness that Soviet concern over China
might lead to its disengagement from Spain,
as the ambassador in Moscow,
Augusto Rosso, reported. Though Ciano
continued to maintain talks with the Chinese, Mussolini’s policy was changing,
as he made the calculation that the Japanese would become one of the four races
dominant in the world, the others being the Germans, Italians and
Russians. In an article which he
published in Il Popolo d’Italia on 6
October, Mussolini declared that “Japan is not formally fascist, but
she is anti-Bolshevist, and the trend of her policy and her people brings her
into the fold of the fascist states.”
Further gestures on behalf of Japan followed, and the Italian government
lodged no protest when an Italian photographer was killed by Japanese planes in
the Panay incident of December 1937,
Ciano dismissing it in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador as a normal
wartime action, though he noted in his Diary that the latter “was surprised and
take aback” by such nonchalance.
Meanwhile, Del Castillo,
supported by zealous Italians policy, by the spread of the war and the signing
of the new Sino-Soviet Pact, presented his first request for official
recognition to the Japanese foreign ministry near the close of August
1937. It referred specifically to the
legal difficulties encountered by Spanish residents in Japan, most of them aligned with
the Nationalists. When Del Castillo
obtained an interview with Hirota on 31 August, the latter mentioned the
possibility of consular agreements, but also expressed fear of possible reprisals
against Japanese ships in Spanish Republican waters. Though the cabinet eventually decided in
favor of Franco’s request, Hirota continued to fear reprisals and postponed any
action.
Del Castillo then turned to the General
Staff, which favored full recognition, while Herrera de la Rosa pressed the
issue in an interview with Konoye on 8 September. These moves brought a change in attitude in
the foreign ministry, which then became “outspokenly favorable” to recognition,
according to a later report by Del Castillo.
This, however, proved an exaggeration, as Del Castillo soon changed his
description to one of merely a “favorable reception” by the foreign ministry
and consequently urged his superiors to gain the backing of Berlin. The reason for the change was
apparently motivated by disputes inside Tokyo.
In the weeks that followed, the Spanish representative and the former military
attaché referred to conflict in Tokyo
between the military and younger diplomats on one side and the senior politicians
and diplomats on the other, the latter fearing international complications.
The Italian ambassador tried to assist
by requesting his two military attachés to take a hand with the Japanese
military, but Berlin
was much less helpful. More influential
was the effect of the “Knatchbull-Hugessen incident,” stemming from a Japanese
assault on the car of the British ambassador to China on 26 August, which seriously
wounded him even though his car had been clearly marked. Tokyo
initially sought to deny responsibility, but after a strongly-worded British
protest, on 6 September the Japanese government expressed its “profound
regrets.” It was two weeks later, when the foreign ministry issued a note
partially admitting responsibility that tension started to diminish, although
on the 28th the army leaders set up their own puppet government in Inner Mongolia in spite that the Japanese War Ministry
contemplated a negotiated end to the conflict.
Developments elsewhere favored Franco’s
suit. In Tokyo, the Republican diplomat Alvarez
Taladriz failed completely in his efforts to occupy the grounds of the Spanish
while in Geneva, at the League of Nations, the
Spanish Republican foreign minister, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, expressed strong support for
China. At that point Franco’s forces completed their
conquest of the northern Republican zone in Spain, encouraging the perception
that they were likely to gain a complete victory in the civil war. The highest-ranking Japanese official to
appear in Spain, the veteran
bureaucrat Usami Uzuhiko, then visited Franco’s headquarters in Salamanca and declared
support for the struggle against Communism and for the recognition of the
Nationalist regime. After receiving
Usami’s report, the Japanese military attaché in Berlin,
Ōshima Hiroshi telegraphed Tokyo,
urging recognition. Oshima himself had been briefed by the Nationalists, and
was soon to be named ambassador in Berlin. The Supreme Imperial Council then approved
recognition in a communication to the Japanese cabinet.
The Manchukuo Connection
The Japanese government’s
international position then grew even more adversarial vis-à-vis the western
powers in November, when it decided to boycott the Brussels
conference, convened by the League of Nations at the petition of China
to investigate the Japanese aggression and to seek means of ending it. Tokyo
had already withdrawn from the League in 1933 and now severed all remaining
links with it.
The Japanese government
declared that it would only agree to direct negotiations with China, brokered either by Berlin
or by Rome, which would lead to a “New Order” in
East Asia but with different focus in the
region. At the recent Nazi rally in
Munich Hitler had stressed the importance of the Spanish conflict as a function
of the Anti-Comintern Pact for the defense of world culture, but failed to
refer to the war in China. Italy
signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on 5 November, an action which, because of the
tension between Rome and London, had the effect of turning it in an
anti-British direction. The Italian goal was now to maintain areas of tension
in both the Mediterranean and East Asia which
even the Royal Navy could not possibly cover.
At the ensuing banquet in Tokyo, Hirota spoke with the German and Italian
ambassadors about recognizing Franco, declaring that “in his view” this should
also involve recognition of Manchukuo
by the Axis, an issue which was totally new.
The Japanese puppet state remained a pariah and had received no
attention from foreign powers for the past three years. Germany
had merely signed a commercial agreement with Mukden in April 1936, while Italy
had opened a consulate rather than a formal legation. Hirota was thus proposing a major quid pro
quo, which hardly facilitated immediate recognition of the Spanish
Nationalists.
Del Castillo was immediately informed
of Hirota’s ploy, and sent word to his superiors by telegram. José Antonio de Sangróniz, the head of Franco’s
diplomatic cabinet, replied in the affirmative on the following day, so that
when the foreign ministry first gave Del Castillo official word of the Hirota
proposal on 8 November, the Spanish diplomat was not only able to accept in
principle but to present an aide-mémoire that granted him authority to
negotiate an agreement. Such an immediate and categorical response perplexed
the Japanese, to the extent that the foreign ministry asked Del Castillo to
provide official confirmation of such powers.
Meanwhile the foreign ministry took
soundings concerning the possible effect on Japanese interests in southern Europe and the western hemisphere. Hirota also suggested on the 10th
that the recognition should be announced in Berlin, to which a Nationalist
representative was properly accredited. On 12 November the Japanese cabinet
approved recognition for the third time, and this time announced it
publicly. Franco’s government confirmed
the validity of Del Castillo’s powers, further reinforced by a statement from Rome by minister Ciano, as
well. Berlin,
however, rejected the idea of a joint recognition of the Franco regime and of
the Manchukuo government that would take place
in Berlin, as the German foreign ministry
sought to avoid complications with Britain
and to pursue peace negotiations in China.
The Japanese foreign ministry then
presented two further complications to Del Castillo. One was a report by its legal department,
which concluded that recognition of Franco’s regime would be contrary to
international law since it did not occupy all Spanish territory. The second raised once more the issue of Manchukuo, linking it to negotiations with Rome and Berlin. On the 12th, Hirota took up with
the latter issue with Auriti, followed by a discussion between Ciano and the
Japanese ambassador in Rome,
and a second talk between Hirota and Auriti.
The Japanese also tested German opinion, since in a speech in Munich on the 9th Hitler had indicated
willingness to recognize Manchukuo.
Then, the issue of Manchukuo once more receded. The international contest was simplified by
the conclusion of the Brussels
conference without any clear recommendation and the recognition of the
Nationalists advanced further. On the 19th,
Del Castillo and the vice-premier discussed further issues, such as whether the
recognition should be associated with previously existing treaties between the
two states, a procedure that would gain the emperor’s approval, while other
ministries were informed of the government’s decision, and news of the
diplomatic process appeared in the Spanish Nationalist press. Del Castillo
reported that negotiations regarding the Manchukuo
should begin as a matter of reciprocity once the Spanish regime had been
recognized. Berlin
remained opposed to the idea of joint recognition and still expressed hope for
a negotiated peace in China
that might bring the latter’s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, together
with a Japanese pledge to respect foreign interests in China, while demonstrating
skepticism to the Italians. Hitler
expressed to the Italian ambassador a willingness to recognize Manchukuo but did nothing to expedite the issue, while
Italian policy preferred to wait for Germany.
Finally, toward the end of November, Manchukuo emerged again.
The Italian government showed more interest in acting on its own, encouraged by
the inconclusiveness of the Brussels
conference and the weak response of the western democracies. On the 24th Ciano wrote in his
Diary that immediate recognition of Manchukuo
would increase Italian influence in East Asia. Franco’s government had hoped for recognition
by the 25th, the anniversary of the signing of the Anti-Comintern
Pact, but the ceremony in Rome
was finally set for four days later and Spaniards had to wait until December
1st. On the 29th Italy recognized Manchukuo,
followed on successive days first by the official Japanese recognition of the
Franco regime, and then by the latter’s recognition of Manchukuo.
The negotiations had accelerated in the final days amid speculation by
the international press and skepticism in Tokyo
about Mussolini’s decision, which The
Times speculated may have come as a surprise. Mussolini’s decisiveness was hastened by his
signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the continuing Japanese military
advance in China.
Events at the ceremony in Tokyo for the recognition of the Franco regime proved more
problematic than anticipated, for the text read by Hirota on 1 December sought
to avoid controversy, referring to the common struggle against Communism,
collaboration with Germany
and Italy and the long
friendship between Spain and
Japan. Since it also permitted Japan to limit recognition to mere
rights of belligerence and even possibly maintain relations with the Republican
regime, Del Castillo refused to sign the agreement. The Spanish chargé countered with an
imaginative solution, which consisted of adding his own language to the text
affirming that Franco’s was the “sole and legitimate government of Spain.” Since he read this statement to the press
after Hirota had already given the latter a copy of his own declaration, Del
Castillo assumed that the recognition already held full legal authority, and
this was undoubtedly so.
The ceremony took place in the
Spanish legation, and included a Catholic mass, the raising of the Falangist
banner (while approximately simultaneously a Japanese flag was being raised in Salamanca) and speeches
by Auriti and Del Castillo. The
Falangist party still had no members in Japan (though Herrera was soon to
be appointed its leader), but the act was attended by members of the Italian
Fascist Party and the Hitler Jugend, as well as by the press. Franco’s recognition of Manchukuo
was effected in a Japanese government office, not in the embassy of Manchukuo, as the
Japanese had proposed. The foreign
ministry appointed the diplomat Takaoka Teiichirō, long resident in Spain, as the new representative to Salamanca.
As the military strengthened their
hold in Tokyo and continued the advance in China, it became increasingly difficult for Germany
to maintain a policy of equidistance. Hitler’s own strategy became increasingly
aggressive with his government changes of February 1938, as he increased his
control of the military and appointed the pro-Japanese Ribbentrop foreign
minister. Hitler’s speech to the
Reichstag on 20 February surprised observers because of the attention devoted
to East Asia and its strongly pro-Japanese
tone. The resulting reorientation of German
policy withdrew military advisers from China
and canceled further arms shipments, leading to the recognition of Manchukuo on 12 May and the breaking of relations with China
the following month.
The coincidence of wars in China and Spain hastened a new international
alignment. For Franco’s government, the
issue of Manchukuo
had not been problematic, since the decision was taken almost immediately in
the hope of a larger quid pro quo. This
initiated a pattern that would be followed three years later in 1940, when a
new Spanish economic mission to Japan also stopped over in Nanjing to talk with
Wang Jingwei’s Chinese puppet government at a time when no one—not even
Tokyo—had officially recognized it. Italy
meanwhile pursued its own interests in the Far East, and its position was later
largely adopted by Germany. The Japanese recognition of Franco followed
the same logic, reflecting the growing dominance of the military combined with
the concern of the more moderate elements to consolidate the position of Manchukuo. These interests then developed an
interlocking momentum of their own, and the army’s decision to conquer Nanjing itself came only a day after Italy’s recognition of Manchukuo.
By 1938 a series of radical developments in Spain,
Italy, Germany and Japan
had converged to reinforce the Japanese military, strengthen somewhat the
position of the Franco regime and decisively alter Italian and German policy in
support of Japan.
Abbreviations
GSK-KT.
Gaimushiryôkan. Kakkoku no Taid. Attitude of foreign counties.
GSK-NK, Gaimushiryôkan . Nairan Kankei
(Civil War)
IMTFE. International Military Tribunal of
the Far East.
CUS. Confidential United States Diplomatic
Records. (microfilm)
BKT Boeichô Kenkyû Toshokan. Library of the
Japanese Defense Agency.
AGA-AE: Archivo General
de la Administración. Asuntos Exteriores section.
AMAE- R. Archivo del
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Renovated Section.
Abstract
JAPAN AND THE AXIS, 1937-1938:
Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo (Florentino Rodao)
Florentino
Rodao, visiting scholar at the Weatherhead
Center for International Studies at
the University of Harvard (2008/09),
teaches at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid
and has received Ph.D.’s from the Universidad Complutense and from the University of Tokyo. He has authored Franco and the Japanese Empire. Images and
Propaganda in a time of a War (Barcelona,
2002) and prepares a monograph on the
coincidences of the Spanish Civil and the Sino-Japanese Wars
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